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ABSTRACT 
There has been a huge amount of organizational investment to cope with computer security incidents, but the incidents 
continue and are expected to increase. Computer security incidents in organizations are primarily dealt with by computer 
security incident response teams (CSIRT). How the team successfully develops and operates is critical for effective and 
efficient responses to the incidents. However, no studies have been conducted in that context. This study investigates the 
factors affecting CSIRT performance based on team performance and crisis management literature through conducting a field 
study using Delphi method and questionnaire survey. The data are analyzed using Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM). We 
expect the study will provide a useful theoretical framework and practical implications to understand CSIRT performance 
and thus successfully counteract computer security incidents.  
Keywords 
Computer security, computer security incident response teams, crisis management, hierarchical linear modeling 
INTRODUCTION 
“Organizations in which the responsibility for crisis preparation and response rests with crisis management 
teams will experience greater success outcomes when managing crises than will those organizations in 
which crisis management responsibility rests with an individual”  (Pearson and Clair 1998, p.71). 
Computer security incidents (CSI) are more widespread, costly, and commonplace although there has been a huge amount of 
investment to implement computer security countermeasures According to a survey (CSI/FBI, 2002), 90% of the US 
organizations surveyed experienced computer security incidents and their volumes are approximately 455 million dollars.  
Previous studies have found reasons stem from insufficient security systems, inappropriate policy, poor knowledge on 
computer security, and light punishment. This study, however, explains how computer security incident response teams 
(CSIRT) successfully develop and operate to cope with the incidents.  
CSIRT is a group of people who orchestrate swift and effective responses to computer security incidents by sharing common 
goals of limiting damage, and reducing recovery time and costs. Considering the fact that successful counteraction of 
Computer security incidents is highly dependent upon the capability and performance of CSIRT, it is valuable to examine 
what factors significantly influence CSIRT performance. Based on team performance and crisis management literature, this 
study develops and empirically tests a research framework of CSIRT performance.     
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Team Performance 
As organizations require dynamic capability to cope with a rapidly changing business environment, they have structured 
work around teams rather than individual jobs. The increasing prevalence of teams as the cornerstone of modern American 
industry is well documented and up to half of the US workforce works in some form of teams. Team refers to a diverse group 
of people with different backgrounds, abilities, and knowledge levels sharing the same goals and common identity to 
accomplish a specific task. Compared to an individual, the team is known to provide organizations flexibility, dynamics and 
synergetic effects, and creative knowledge (Guzzo and Shea, 1992). There has been considerable research investigating 
factors affecting team performance (e.g. LePine, 2003) and consistently identifying that all individual, team and 
organizational factors are important to enhance the effectiveness of a team.  
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Crisis Management Team 
A crisis management team is a group of people within the organization who have been designed to handle a particular crisis. 
The ability to make correct and appropriate decisions in the midst of a crisis is very important and difficult. Previous studies 
(e.g. Nunamaker et al., 1989; Pearson and Clair, 1998) have emphasized the value of a team-based approach to cope with 
crisis. A crisis management team provides a variety of perspectives and skills, facilitates better decision making, accelerates 
information and resource flow, fosters synergetic contributions, and creates and institutionalizes a positive mind-set under 
crisis situations. 
The key factors for successful crisis management teams have been identified from several studies. For instance, King (2002) 
investigated five factors that affect crisis management team performance such as prior interactions, team composition, task 
knowledge, leadership ability, and organization culture, but these were not empirically tested. Weick (1993) examined the 
factors (i.e. improvisation, virtual role systems, the attitude of wisdom, and norms of respectful interaction) affecting crisis 
management team performance.   
Crisis Management in the IS field 
Compared to numerous crisis management studies in other disciplines, a few studies have been conducted on crisis 
management in the IS field but no studies have yet been performed to examine CSIRT and its performance context. Housel et 
al. (1986) proposed a generic set of design guidelines to implement information systems for crisis management. Nunamaker 
et al. (1989) investigated a set of crisis planning tools to help organizations operate intelligently in crisis situations. Similarly, 
Hale (1997) developed layered communication architecture for supporting crisis response teams. Finally, Sniezek et al. 
(2002) examined the influence of crisis management training systems to decision-making performance, called DC-Train to 
aid decision-making performance.  
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Figure 1. Research Model 
HYPOTHESES 
Our research framework of CSIRT performance is developed based on team performance and crisis management literature 
(Figure 1). In this study, security incident is specifically defined as a crisis caused by cyber attacks of malicious outsiders, 
which prevent normal business operation at least during a couple of hours, resulting in a significant amount of business 
losses. Team performance refers to the extent to which CSIRT successfully copies with the security incidents.  
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Individual Variables:  
Cognitive ability is defined as “the capacity to understand complex ideas, learn from experience, reason, problem solve, and 
adapt” (Devine and Philips 2001, p. 507). Cognitive ability positively relates to task performance, especially in tasks that 
require high mental representation and manipulation of information obtained from the environment and long-term memory. 
LePine (2003) found that cognitive ability of team members is especially important while conducting uncertain and 
unexpected tasks and has a positive relationship with team performance.  
Conscientiousness refers to “a characteristic that includes feelings of competence, achievement striving, and being self-
disciplined” (LePine 2003, p. 29). Studies indicated that highly conscientious individuals have the tendency to set difficult 
goals for themselves and are more perseverant and committed to those goals. They also have high self-efficacy and 
expectation and eventually achieve a high level of job performance 
Openness is defined as “a personality characteristic that reflects imaginativeness, curiosity, originality, and broadmindness” 
(LePine 2003, p. 29). Open individuals tend to engage in the type of self-monitoring that is necessary for learning in novel 
situations. They are also positively associated with creativity and receptivity that are crucial to conduct tasks under uncertain, 
unpredicted, and complex situations. 
Team members with prior knowledge have a greater understanding of the tasks, are more structured, knowledgeable, and 
goal-oriented than a team without prior knowledge.  Devine and Philips (2001) found that task knowledge becomes more 
important when the task has a high degree of complexity and a high-level of decision-making among team members. 
H1: Team members’ cognitive ability (H1a), conscientiousness (H1b), openness (H1c) and knowledge (H1d) are 
positively related to CSIRT performance.  
Team Variables:   
Team potency is defined as “a collective belief by members of a team that the team can be effective across tasks” (Jordan et 
al. 2002, p. 125). Team potency influences team performance by affecting the extent to which team members apply their 
resources and effort to the team’s tasks (Guzzo and Shea, 1992). Several studies found a positive relationship between team 
potency and team performance. For example, Hackman (1990) insisted that teams with high potency are more committed and 
more willing to work hard for the team.   
Team cohesion, referring to the resultant forces that are acting on the members to stay in a group, is also known to have a 
critical influence on team performance (Hackman, 1990). Team cohesion is a general indicator of synergistic team interaction 
or process. When team members have high cohesion, they are willing to assist team members, share feedback, and contribute 
ideas (Jordan et al., 2002).   
The importance of leadership for crisis management team performance is also well recognized. King (2002) pointed out that 
a successfully managed crisis depends upon the team leader’s ability to manage the diverse members. The team leader makes 
organizations return to a state of normalcy using his/her versatile capability such as strong interpersonal skills to inspire and 
motivate team members, the ability to create symbolic vision and image of competence, trustworthiness, loyalty and 
confidence.   
Past studies also pointed out heterogeneous teams perform their tasks better than homogeneous teams do (King, 2002). This 
is because while homogeneous groups are typically less goal and task oriented, which leads to unrealistic and poor team 
decision-making, heterogeneity promotes the opportunity for diverse opinions and attitudes, freedom of expression, and 
better decision-making by team members. 
H2: Strong CSIRT potency (H2a), cohesion (H2b), leadership (H2c), and heterogeneity (H2d) are positively related 
to CSIRT performance.  
Organizational Variables:   
Whether a crisis is successfully managed or not is highly dependent on top management support for crisis management 
teams. Pearson and Clair (1998) indicated that a crisis worsens when top management has an ambiguous attitude towards a 
crisis and the crisis management team. CSIRT needs strong top management support since the team can successfully operate 
only when top management overtly states his/her support and provides authority to the team.  
In the event of a crisis, researchers (e.g. King, 2002) emphasize the importance of supportive organizational culture noting 
that the beliefs and assumptions held by employees within the organization to successfully cope with incidents that affect the 
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organization’s return to normal operation. A crisis worsened when there is lack of common sense and no trust of the crisis 
management team among employees. 
H3: Top management support (H3a) and supportive organizational culture (H3b) to CSIRT are positively related to 
CSIRT performance.  
Computer Security Incident-Specific Variables:  
Improvisation refers to rapid, improvised yet creative and relevant decisions under unexpected, inexperienced and resource 
constrained situations (Weick, 1993). Studies emphasized the team capability of swift and accurate crisis management 
decision making and emphasized the training for improvisation capability to make excellent decisions under crisis (e.g. 
D'Aveni and MacMillan, 1990).  
Respectful interactions among team members significantly influence the effectiveness of a crisis management team (King 
2002).  Team members familiar with each other’s skills, perspectives, and interpersonal styles might display a freer, more 
open format of communication under crisis.  Gruenfeld et al. (1996) argued that “the greater the number of familiar members 
in a team, the more open they were to learning from one other, the more they enjoyed working together and the greater their 
satisfaction with outcomes” (p. 11).  
The reconstruction of reality in each team member’s head amidst the computer security incidents is called virtual role 
systems. If each team member can simulate other teammates’ roles in his/her mind and acknowledge the team leader and 
facilitate coordination, then s/he literally becomes a team and effectively counteract the incidents (Weick, 1993). Similarly, 
virtual role systems directly linked to team performance through better quality of communication and quick and high level 
consensus. 
Attitude of wisdom refers to acting with knowledge while simultaneously doubting what one knows. That is, extremes must 
be avoided. Extreme confidence and extreme caution both are closed-minded, which means that neither leads to good 
judgments. The attitude of wisdom is crucial in making sense of one’s environment, particularly in the context of rapid and 
unpredictable situations. In sum, assuming that CSIRT can successfully fight with computer security incidents if they behave 
swiftly, with clearly recognizing and respecting each teammate’s role and without making extreme decision, we hypothesize 
that:  
H4: Improvisation (H4a), respectful interaction (H4b), virtual role systems (H4c), and attitude of wisdom (H4d) are 
positively related to CSIRT performance. 
Previous team performance studies pointed out that task-specific variables moderate the relationship between antecedents of 
team performance and team performance (e.g. Hirokawa and Keyton, 1995). In line with the studies, we hypothesize that 
computer security incidents variables moderate the relationship between individual, team, and organizational variables and 
team performance. 
H5: The relationships in H1, H2, and H3 are moderated by improvisation (H5a), respectful interaction (H5b), virtual 
role systems (H5c), and attitude of wisdom (H5d). 
Finally, this study includes three control variables that have been recognized to affect team performance and examines their 
effects.  They are organization size, and team size and periodical training. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
First, we conduct extensive literature reviews on team performance and crisis management. Second, Delphi study with 
CSIRT or similar team members to find specific computer security incident variables is followed. Third, initial instrument is 
developed and pretested by experts in related fields (see Table 1). Third, a pilot test is followed to validate the instrument. 
Finally, a field study using online survey with 132 CSIRTs and their team members (approximately 1,260) is conducted. A 
high response rate is expected since a prestigious computer security research center sponsoring this project. The data are 
analyzed using Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM 5.0) (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002) because our study includes both 
individual and team-level factors. The primary advantage of HLM is that it allows one to simultaneously investigate 
relationships within a particular hierarchical level as well as relationships between or across hierarchical levels.  
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Criteria Constructs Items Instrument Examples 
Openness 3 Enjoy learning new solutions to the incidents 
Cognitive Ability 3 Quickly understand and adapt the incidents  
Conscientiousness 3 Perseverant until resolving the incidents 
Individual  
Variable 
Knowledge 3 Information of security incidents and sources of solutions 
and outer experts 
Top Mgmt. Support 2 Top managers’ resource support to CSIRT Organizational 
Variable Supportive Org. Culture 2 Confidence to overcome the incidents among employees 
Team Potency 3 Confidence to meet any challenges  
Team Cohesion 3 Closeness among team members 
Leadership 3 Team leader has strong interpersonal skills  
Team 
Variable 
Team Composition 3 Diverse ability among team members 
Improvisation 3 Quick consensus under time pressure 
Respectful Interaction 3 Respectful communication among team members 
Attitude of Wisdom 3 Make moderate decision making 
Security 
Incident 
Specific 
Variable Virtual Role Systems 3 Simulate the teammates’ roles in my mind 
DV CSIRT Performance 3 Time taken to settle down/Team Size 
Table 1. Examples of Measurement Instruments  
EXPECTED FINDINGS AND CURRENT STATUS 
It is expected to provide a theoretical framework to understand CSIRT performance and empirically validate the framework 
through an extensive field study.  Especially by adopting HLM, we simultaneously examine the effects of both individual-
level and team-level factors to CSIRT performance. We also provide useful insights to management on how to create CSIRT 
and allocate limited resources to manage them.   
We are currently in the process of finalizing initial instruments based on extensive literature reviews, and conducting Delphi 
study. We are confident that we will be able to present study results at the conference.  
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